Article information
RESUMEN
El objetivo del presente trabajo es valorar el equilibrio de las fuerzas organizativas en la construcción de una arquitectura organizativa eficiente y, todo ello, bajo un enfoque de agencia. Los resultados del análisis empírico, llevado a cabo en las más importantes ONGD españolas durante el año 2003, ponen de relieve la gran importancia de la influencia mutua de la delegación de derechos de decisión, sistemas de incentivos y el uso de medidas de evaluación del rendimiento en el logro del equilibrio organizativo, lo que nos permite afirmar que, para el caso estudiado, la teoría se confirma.
PALABRAS CLAVE:
Arquitectura Organizativa
Incentivos
Delegación
Rendimiento
ONGD
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the balance of organizational components in the design of an efficient organizational architecture from an agency perspective. The results of the empirical analysis, performed in the most prominent Spanish NGDO throughout the year 2003, show the great importance of the mutual influence among the delegation of decision rights, the incentive systems and the use of performance measurements in the achievement of organizational equilibrium.
KEYWORDS:
Organizational Architecture
Incentives
Delegation
Performance
NGDOs
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